* SECURITY UPDATE: Bleichenbacher/Marvin timing oracle in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption. Distinguishing a padding failure from a successful decryption, by error or by plaintext length, lets an attacker with chosen ciphertexts recover the plaintext of an intercepted message. This is the incomplete-fix follow-up to CVE-2020-25659. - debian/patches/CVE-2023-50782.patch: expose Cryptography_HAS_IMPLICIT_RSA_REJECTION from the linked OpenSSL headers in src/_cffi_src/openssl/rsa.py, and skip the PKCS1v15 padding-error assertion when that OpenSSL implicitly rejects invalid padding, in tests/hazmat/primitives/test_rsa.py. - The behaviour that closes the oracle comes from OpenSSL implicit rejection (LP: #2054090); built against an OpenSSL without it the constant compiles as 0 and this package behaves as before. - CVE-2023-50782 * Build fix: call email.utils.parseaddr with strict=False in src/cryptography/x509/general_name.py. The ELS python2.7 and python3.6 carry CVE-2023-27043.patch, whose strict parser guards on isinstance(addr, str); on Python 2 that is bytes, so every unicode argument yields ('', '') and RFC822Name rejects valid addresses, which breaks collection of the package test suite. - debian/patches/fix-parseaddr-call.patch: same workaround the centos7els branch of this package already carries.